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THIS PAPER concerns the question of how the rules for calculating
the investment tax credit and the associated rules for calculating de-
preciation allowances for tax purposes should be structured to assure
the "appropriate" relationship between the subsidy granted to long-
lived assets and that to short-lived assets. Under the U.S. federal in-
come tax a credit is allowed against tax liability equal to a certain
fraction of the cost of qualifying investments. The fraction depends
on the durability of the asset, as measured by its "useful life." For
assets with useful lives of less than three years no credit is allowed;
assets with lives of between three and five years qualify for a credit of
3% percent; those with lives of between five and seven years, 6%
percent; and those with lives of seven or more years, 10 percent.'
This credit against tax is ignored in the calculation of tax allowances
for depreciation, which are based on the historical cost of the asset.2
The author would like to acknowledge helpful discussions with Seymour Fiekow-
sky, Harvey Galper, and Roger Gordon on the subject of this paper. Any opinions
expressed are those of the author and not of Princeton University or the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
1. This description neglects the extra credit that is allowed, contingent on em-
ployer contributions to a qualifying employee stock ownership plan.
2. The Long Amendment (named for the chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, Senator Russell B. Long), a part of the original investment credit enacted
in 1962 but subsequently repealed with retroactive effect, required subtraction of the
investment credit from the purchase price of the asset in the calculation of deprecia-
tion allowances.
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Bothof these features of the tax rules have a bearing on the choice
by an investor between long- and short-lived assets. The increasing
rate of tax subsidy under the investment credit favors long-lived as-
sets by comparison with a flat-rate credit, while the neglect of the
credit in calculating depreciation allowances favors short-lived assets
(for which the depreciation allowance is a more important element in
the cash flow). There is considerable confusion about which of these
two biases in the rules is the right one.3 In reviewing the literature on
this issue Sunley focused on the question of whether the investment
credit should vary with the durability of the asset purchased.4 He
concluded that neutrality requires a subsidy rate increasing with the
useful life of the asset in a way qualitatively similar to that prescribed
in present U.S. law.
This paper develops Sunley's discussion through the use of simple
formal models of the yield from investment. A principal conclusion
is a qualified confirmation of Sunley's view that neutrality requires
the rate of credit to increase with asset life. Furthermore, if tax rules
are otherwise fundamentally correct, the cost basis for depreciation
allowances should be net of investment tax credit.5 Even with this
condition, however, it is not possible in general to present a neutral
rule for calculating the investment credit independently of the rate
of interest and of the detailed pattern of returns from the asset.
The essential principle underlying the conclusions of this paper is
that efficiency requires equality of the before-tax and before-subsidy
rates of return on investments in assets of various durabilities. To
obtain an efficient allocation, subsidy and tax rules must be appro-
priately related to the durability of the assets. Although it may be
possible to design such a relationship in the case of the investment
credit applied to assets within some limited class of durability charac-
teristics (for example, within the class of assets that lose a constant
fraction of their value every year), no simple rule will give appro-
priate results for all classes. In particular, the cases examined il-
3. It is sometimes argued that the increasing subsidy for longer-lived assets is
justified primarily as a rough offset to the failure to use as the basis for depreciation
the true effective cost to the investor, namely, the after-tax credit cost.
4. Emil Sunley, Jr., "Tax Neutrality between Capital Services Provided by Long-
Lived and Short-Lived Assets," in U.S. Department of the Treasury, OTA Papers,
vol. 1: Compilation of OTA Papers (Government Printing Office, 1978).
5. That is, the Long Amendment is necessary. It is not suggested that the de-
preciation rules available under U.S. law are correct; they certainly are inadequate
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lustratethe way simple rules relating investment credit to the single
dimension, "asset life," go wrong as the actual pattern of returns
varies from exponential decay to point output, to constant flow out-
put.G
The analysis takes up in turn three special models of investment
opportunities: point input, exponentially declining output; point in-
put, point output; and point input, constant flow output. The first is
perhaps the most familiar to economists. Exponential decay is much
the most convenient depreciation assumption to make in models of
economic growth. It has also been common in the tax literature.1
The very analytical convenience that makes exponential depreciation
attractive, however, may lead to neglect of the question of how con-
clusions are affected by it. Hence a section of the paper is devoted
to the alternative investment models mentioned.
For the most part I assume that taxpayers use true "economic"
depreciation in calculating income subject to tax. This assumption is
important because it assures that if the investment subsidy can be
made "neutral," the income tax system, whether proportional or
progressive, will influence investment only via its effect on savings and
not via the composition of the capital stock.8 It is necessary in this
context to be clear about the definition of economic depreciation, an
issue that calls for a digression on "recapture" and the treatment of
secondhand assets.
Taxes and Investment Credit in an Exponential World
The model of investment made familiar by Jorgenson is most
naturally interpreted as a world in which the quantity of capital con-
sists of a number of identical physical units (for example, shovels
6. Such shortcomings of simple approximating rules need not imply the proce-
dures should be changed. The relative performance of different rules of thumb is
the issue. It does appear that for purposes of subsidizing investment a partial write-off
for tax purposes would be both simpler and superior to present practices from the
point of view of neutrality. This point is developed more fully by Harberger in this
volume.
7. See, for example, Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, "Tax Policy and
Investment Behavior," American EconomicReview, vol.57 (June 1967), pp. 391—
414.
8. See Paul A. Samuelson, "Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to In-
sure Invariant Valuations," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 72 (December 1964),
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or machines) .Eachmachine produces a fixed output per period. As
a result of physical deterioration, a fixed proportion of the stock of
machines disappears each period.
In this world the quantity of capital of any particulartype is readily
understood. Whereas in a more general case itmay not be obvious
what quantity of capital I own when I have a one-year-old machine,
it is clear how many units I own if they consist of a fraction of the
previous year's stock of identical machines.
The "rental cost of capital," c, also has a ready interpretation in this
model: it is the price paid for the use of one machine for one period.
In a competitive system this price will clear the market for machine
services, equating the quantity supplied by capitalists to the quantity
demanded by firms for use in production.
Particular interest attaches to the relationship in equilibrium be-
tween the rental cost of capital, the market rate of interest, i, and the
price, q, of a newly produced machine. Under my assumptions, in the
absence of taxes the capitalist receives a cash flow from a machine,
c exp[—s], where is the fractional rate at which machines disap-
pear and s is the age of the machine. The capitalist able to borrow
and lend at the market rate of interest, i (I neglect uncertainty





If an income tax is imposed at proportional rate,u, the capitalist
will evaluate net-of-tax cash flows at his after-tax rate of return from
lending, (1 —u)i.1°The cash flow from purchasing a machine will
also be affected by (1) any investment tax credit assumed equal to k
per unit invested, and (2) depreciation allowances assumed granted
9. See Hall and Jorgenson, "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior."
10. The analysis that follows is most easily understood as applying to direct
investment by individuals. It will apply to corporations as well if it is assumed that
the same marginal rate of tax applies to shareholder equity returns and the bond
interest of those shareholders. For a fully satisfactory treatment, however, one
would have to resolve analytical problems (for example, the existence of many dif-
ferent shareholder tax rates) beyond the scope of this paper.Tax Neutrality and the Investment Tax Credit 285











Z(ra) =fexp [—r]D() d
is the present value to the taxpayer of the tax-allowed depreciation
deductions on one unit of tax basis if Ta is the taxpayer's after-tax re-
turn. For easier comparison with the equilibrium condition without
taxes this can alternatively be written as
c/q =(Ta+ )[l —k—uZ(Ta)]/(l—u).'3
When the depreciation schedule, D(s), is applied to the effective
purchase price, (1 —k)q, rather than the nominal historical price, q,
the equilibrium relationship between c and q (expression 1) is re-
placed by
c/q =(r'+ )[l —uZ(Ta)](l—k)/(l — u).
11. This roughly describes present law.
12. These formulas apply for an investment held forever. Hence it is not neces-
sary to be concerned about the proceeds of sate of the asset. This will only be wealth
maximizing appropriate tax rules, even in the steady state with constant c, q, ii,andi,
as is discussed further below.
13. As the derivation indicates, because tax rates and hence after-tax rates of
return vary among taxpayers, the supply price of machine services may vary from
taxpayer to taxpayer. This variation is incompatible with equilibrium in the market
for machine services. Such inconsistency may be resolved by sorting out asset types
by the tax brackets of their owners, as occurs in tax shelter situations. In what
follows, to avoid having to deal with this, assume Uisthe same for alt taxpayers.
For an analysis of how opportunities for profit are eliminated when taxpayers face
different rates, see David F. Bradford, "The Tax System, Saving, and Capital For-
mation," in George von Furstenberg, ed., Capital Investment and Saving, vol. 2:
The Government and Capital Formation (Ballinger, 1980).286 TheEconomics of Taxation
True Depreciation: A Conceptual Problem
What is the rate of economic or true depreciation experienced by
investors under either of these systems? There is a certain ambiguity
about this question arising out of the subsidy, k, and the possible tax
advantage or disadvantage due to the difference between the depre-
ciation allowed in calculating the tax and that actually occurring.
As far as the replacement cost of the asset is concerned, the matter
is clear. Under the exponential decay assumption the pattern of physi-
cal depreciation is described by
(2) D*(s) = exp (—ôs).
Because in this case the actual decay takes the form of a reduction in
the number of identical physical machines, the decline in replacement
cost value (the price paid by the buyer before receiving any credit)
must follow this pattern as well. The replacement cost of a machine
of age s and of type 6 must be given by q exp (—6s), and the in-
stantaneous loss at that age is given by D* (s) q.
This would describe the path of the demand price of the asset if a
purchaser of the used asset could obtain the same tax and subsidy
treatment as if he had purchased the same number of identical but
newly produced machines. The value to the original purchaser of the
asset will generally be less than this amount because tax and credit
advantages will have already been realized. Special rules are required
to prevent, for example, the buyer of a new machine from obtaining
the investment credit and then immediately reselling his asset to an-
other purchaser, who in turn receives the same credit. The "recap-
ture" rules of the U.S. tax system, applicable to the investment credit
and certain forms of accelerated depreciation, as well as special rules
for the treatment of used assets, are designed to moderate such tax-
motivated transactions.11 To avoid complexity, I assume that these
rules are perfect so that the tax system has no influence on the desired
time-since-acquisition structure of a capitalist's stock of machines.15
ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION TO THE HOLDER. What is the path of
asset value to the holder of one of the machines who plans to keep it
14. See Gerard M. Brannon and Emil M. Sunley, Jr., "The 'Recapture' of Excess
Tax Depreciation on the Sale of Real Estate," National Tax Journal, vol. 29 (De-
cember 1976), pp. 413—21, for an interesting and surprising discussion of recapture
rules in the U.S. income tax.
15. Recall that the assumption is that all machines having the same durability
coefficient, 8, are identical, regardless of the time since construction.Tax Neutrality and the Investment Tax Credit 287
perpetually? I refer to the rate of decrease of asset value along this
path as "economic depreciation." It will in general depend on the tax
rules, including the depreciation allowances. Hence to use economic
depreciation for tax purposes requires finding a fixed point: economic
depreciation is a function of tax depreciation; a rule is sought that will
make tax depreciation equal economic depreciation.
Let v(s) denote the value of a machine as a function of the time, s,
since original construction and purchase, and let H(s) represent the
schedule of depreciation allowances—as distinguished from the
schedule of depreciation rates, D (s), against basis—for tax purposes.
Then the cash flow from the asset at t is
(1 —u)cexp (—ôt) + uH(t),
so that
(4) v(s) =(1—u)cfexp(—ô) exp [_ra( —s)]d
Jo
+ uf H()exp[—r —s)]dE.
The expression for depreciation is found by differentiating expres-
sion 4 to obtain
—v'(s) =(1—u)cexp (—ôs) + uH(s) —(1—u)craf exp (—)
exp[_ra(E —s)]dE + ura f H(s) exp [_ra(E —s)]dE
=cashflow at s —ray(s).
If the value of depreciation in this sense is used for tax purposes
(call this schedule H* (s)), then using —v'(s) =H*(s):
(1 —u)H4'(s)=(1—u)cexp (—as) —r"v(s).
Differentiating,
(1 —u)H*'(s)=—(l—u)cexp (—es) + raH*(s).
This equation has a solution:
H*(s) =[6(1—u)cexp (—&s)]/[ra + 6(1 —u)]
=[6cexp (—ös)]/(i+ 6)
=[6/(i+ o)Xbefore-tax cash flow at age s).288 TheEconomics of Taxation
Note that this user depreciation schedule is not related to the pur-
chase price of the asset. Such a relationship will be a derived conse-
quence of market equilibrium. The sum of all depreciation allowances
according to this formula is given by
(6) v(O) =I [kexp (—ÔE)]/(i + ) d =c/(i+ ô).
Jo
The right-hand side is the purchase price, q, if q (i+ )c,the
equilibrium relationship in the absence of taxes. And in this case the
economic depreciation to the holder is equal to replacement cost de-
preciation, given by expression 2. If this relationship does not hold,
the depreciation allowances will sum to a total different from the
purchase price.
THE PROBLEM OF THE INVESTMENT CREDIT. This reasoning and
the calculations that went before it are based implicitly on the mathe-
matical assumption that v (s) is a differentiable function. This as-
sumption seems safe enough for all the features of the tax system
except the investment tax credit. Thus expression 3 correctly de-
scribes the cash flow except at the moment of purchase, when there is
an additional lump sum accumulation (an infinitely high cash flow
for an instant) equal to the rebated investment tax credit. Similarly
expression 4 is correct for s greater than zero, but v(O) does not cor-
rectly describe the value of a new asset to the holder. That value
depends on the investment subsidy and its tax treatment.
One may think of the purchaser of an asset at price q as receiving
with the asset a coupon good for kq in cash. Neglecting the question
of whether there is enough tax liability to collect kq (because under
present U.S. law the credit is only usable to pay taxes), there are two
ways of viewing this coupon. First, it may be ignored for tax purposes,
in which case presumably the decline in asset value that takes place
when the owner tears off the coupon and cashes it will also be disal-
lowed as a deduction, even though it reflects a real fall in asset value
to the holder.1 Second, the coupon value may be taken into taxable
receipts, in which case the associated decline in asset value will also
be recognized for tax purposes.
Both approaches have the same effect on the net-of-tax cash flow
of the purchaser of the asset. Therefore let V denote the value to the
holder when the true depreciation to the holder is used for tax pur-
16. This is the treatment under the Long Amendment (see note 2).Tax Neutrality and the Investment Tax Credit 289
poses, and when either of the treatments above is applied to the tax
credit. Then
V =kq+ v(O),




Hence from expression 5,inequilibrium
H*(s)(i —k)ôexp (—ôs).
Several conclusions may be drawn from this exploration of eco-
nomic depreciation to the holder, none perhaps wholly unexpected.
First, in equilibrium the "basis" for tax depreciation purposes,
v(O), is the net of credit price to the buyer, (1 —k)q,either because
the subsidy is not taken into taxable receipts and not allowed as an
immediate write-off or because the subsidy is taken into taxable
receipts and immediately deducted. Either approach accurately re-
flects the path of asset value to the owner and leads to a sum of de-
preciation allowances equal to the appropriate cost of the asset.
Second, given this use of true depreciation, the tax rate has no effect
on the equilibrium relationship between the rental cost of capital, c,
and the price of a newly produced machine, q, except as it may in-
fluence the rate of interest, i. Third, the investment credit does enter
the equilibrium condition in such a way as to influence the durability
of assets emerging, even though the "correct" basis for depreciation
is used. This conclusion brings me back to the principal concern of
this paper.
Efficiency and the Durability of Assets
What is the requirement of efficiency in the allocation of invest-
ment at a given instant among machines of different durabilities? For
simplicity I concentrate on steady states where the relevant marginal
productivities can be regarded as constant over time. The question
can then be rephrased: how should investment be allocated so as to
obtain the highest sustainable flow of net output?290 The Economics of Taxation
To answer this question, consider the perpetuity obtainable by
sacrificing a unit of consumption to purchase an asset of type 8 and
subsequently reinvesting sufficient amounts of the proceeds to keep
net output constant. The way to do this is to reinvest the replacement
cost depreciation from the gross yield. By doing this it is possible to
maintain a steady flow of (c/qs —6) where co is here interpreted as
the consumption-good flow of output from the new machine, and qo
is taken to be the consumption-good cost of a machine of type 8.'
(Note the shift from price to real productivity and cost concepts.)
Thus at least if attention is confined to constant net output "steady
state" paths, efficiency in the allocation of each instant's investment
requires
(8) —= c/q—
ifboth types 6 and 6' are employed.
THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT AND EFFICIENCY WITH TRUE
HOLDER'S DEPRECIATION. In order to assess the efficiency implications
of various rules for the investment credit, it is necessary to consider
the relationship between the marginal productivity of machines, Cs,
and the marginal consumption good cost, qo, of the immediately pre-
ceding analysis and the rental price of machines, c, and the market
price, q, of a machine in competitive equilibrium. To keep the anal-
ysis within manageable bounds I make the usual growth-model as-
sumption that the production process generates output that is either
immediately consumable or convertible to machines of various types
(identified by 6) on fixed terms (depending possibly on the stock or
17. To demonstrate this proposition, let 1(1)bethe amount reinvested in asset
type at time t, where the whole proceEs is regarded as starting at time 0. 1(1) will
be the difference between the gross yield from the initial investment plus subsequent
reinvestment and c5/q0 —.Itwill thus satisfy
1(t) =j 1(e) d + e —( —
Onemay quickly verify by substitution that the solution to this integral equation is
given by
That is, the program of constantly reinvesting the depreciation flow maintains gross
output constant and thus maintains net output at c0/q5 —. Toobtain any higher
net output flow would require at least for some finite time accepting a lower net
output flow.Tax Neutrality and the Investment Tax Credit 291
rateof production of the machine type in question). This means that
both c and q can be regarded as measuring correctly the consumption
opportunity cost of, respectively, the use and the construction of a
machine. Since I am now concerned with machines of different dura-
bilities, furthermore, I refine the price notation, and let co and qo rep-
resent, respectively, the rental price of a unit of type 8 machine ser-
vices, and the price of one new type 8 machine.
Under these conditions efficiency in investment can be identified
with the equating of the before-tax rate of return (internal rate of
return) from investment. This internal rate of return on type 8 is
given by
ro=co/qo—&.
Condition 7 shows that when k= 0this requirement is satisfied in
equilibrium, regardless of the proportional tax rate, u.8
When kisnot zero, condition 7 says that co/qa —8=(1—
k)i—k6.While iisthe same for all asset types, 6 obviously is not.
Consider now the question of the relationship between asset dura-
bility and investment credit needed (when all assets display exponen-
tial capacity decay) to obtain efficiency in the presence of the credit.
Because efficiency requires co/qo —6to be the same for all 6, formula
7 can be used to express the requirement for k:
c/q—= (1—k)i+(1 —k)ô — ô =
wherer is the internal rate of return common to all investments in an
efficient program. Let k(6)be the relationship between tax credit
and durability required for efficiency. Then, solving formula 9 for
k (8) explicitly,
k(ö)= 1 — (r+ô)/(i + 6)
isobtained.
As expected, the subsidy must increase with durability (decline
with 8) in order to obtain neutrality, with a zero subsidy for a zero
life asset (8 =oo).The "right" subsidy for each durability cannot,
however, be specified in advance unless one can correctly anticipate
the equilibrium interest rate.
18. This is the point established in Samuelson, "Tax Deductibility of Economic
Depreciation."292 The Economics of Taxation
Point Input, Point Output, and Related
Investment Models
To explore the effect of varying the exponential decay assumption
I consider in this section the cases of (1) point input, point output
and (2) point input, constant flow output production.
Point In put, Point Output
The assumption here, as it was implicitly in the previous section,
is a homogeneous output that can either be consumed or invested.
In this case, however, one cannot naturally associate units such as
"number of machines" with investment. Consequently it will be
simpler to consider a unit investment of type d as costing one unit of
consumption and yielding yd units of consumption d time units later.
This is to be understood as the entire return, liquidating the invest-
ment.
EFFICIENCY AND EQUILIBRIUM. The efficiency condition in this
model, corresponding to condition 8 in the exponential decay model,
may be derived by noting that the time pattern of an investment with
returns after, say, two periods can be reproduced by investment in a
one-period project together with reinvestment of all proceeds for a
further period. Generalizing, this requires for all d and d' represent-
ing investments actually undertaken in positive amounts
(10) yd =
Theinternal rate of return, rd, associated with an investment in




It will be immediately verified from formula 10 that efficiency implies
equalizing the internal rate of return on investment opportunities
pursued. In the absence of taxes, wealth maximizing capitalists will
equate the internal rate of return at all investment margins to the rate
of interest;
(12) i=re
for all d, thus satisfying necessary condition 10 for efficiency.Tax Neutrality and the investment Tax Credit 293
THE EFFECT OF AN INVESTMENT CREDIT. It will simplify the anal-
ysis of the effect of an investment tax credit if one takes for granted
the proposition that if correctly calculated economic depreciation is
used for tax purposes, tax rates do not upset the efficiency of market
equilibrium in the sense of condition 10. The effect of a credit at
percentage rate k is then to change the market equilibrium in condi-
tion 12 to
i—r'd,





Ifexpression 14 is used, equilibrium condition 12 can be rewritten:
ra =i+ [ln(1 —k)]/d.
Asin the previous model, the rate of credit, k, must be varied with the
durability of assets (interpreted here as the time, d, between point
investment and point return) to assure satisfaction of efficiency con-
dition 10. Unlike the previous case, there is in this model a method for
doing this independently of the equilibrium rate of interest: k need
simply be varied to maintain the constancy of in (I —k)/d.
An explicit expression for the schedule, k(d), of credits necessary
to assure a given common before-subsidy rate of return, r, can be
obtained by solving expression 15 to obtain
k(d) =1—expE(r —i)d].
Point input, Constant Flow Output
In the last special investment model I assume that in return for a
point input of one dollar of forgone consumption a constant flow of
output at rate XT can be generated from the instant of investment until
a time T periods later, at which point the investment is exhausted.
To analyze the efficiency conditions for a program of investments
of different durabilities it will be convenient to assume that the point
input, point output opportunities are also available. Since a point in-
put, flow output pattern can be reproduced by an appropriate mixture
of point input, point output projects, efficiency requires that the cost294 TheEconomics of Taxation
of the two methods of obtaining the same effect be the same. In par-
ticular, by undertaking xT/y,j units of type d point input, point output
investment for all d between 0 and T, a steady output flow of XT per
period is produced over the interval. This investment program costs
(16) (xT/y) dE,
and efficiency requires this to equal 1. Let r, defined as in expression
11, denote the common internal rate of return on all point input, point
output projects in an efficient program. Then, using expression 16,
efficiency in the point input, constant flow output case requires
(17) XT f exp (—re) d =1
for all "durabilities," T, in use. This is precisely the requirement that
the internal rate of return, r7,, defined in expression 18 also equal r
for all T employed.
(18) XT f exp (—rTE) dE =1.
In the absence of investment subsidies, wealth maximization will
lead to the equating of all investment returns to the market rate of
interest, by the usual arguments. Let r denote the after-subsidy in-
ternal rate of return, defined by
XT fT exp (—rE) d =1—k.
Equilibrium now requires
(19) i=r
for all durabilities, T, employed.
It will not in general be true that the before-subsidy internal rate of
return associated with this equilibrium will be the same for all T, as
required for efficiency. Suppressing the associated algebra, one can
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where risthe common social rate of return on real investment and i
is the market rate of interest, which by expression 19 also equals the
rate of return to the investor.
As in the two previous models, efficiency requires the subsidy rate
to increase with the life of the investment. Further, as in the exponen-
tial decay model, but not as in the point input, point output case, it is
necessary to know the equilibrium situation—that is, to know i—in
order to obtain the rule for the efficiency-preserving relationship be-
tween credit and asset durability.
Summing Up
The foregoing analysis gives a formal demonstration of two gen-
eral principles: (1) that a credit varying with the durability of the
investment is required for neutrality of the subsidy with respect to this
aspect of investment choice; and (2) that a different structure of such
credits will in general be necessary for different patterns of returns.
Table 1 suggests the importance of these principles as a practical mat-
ter. This table illustrates the structure of credits required to induce a
common before-credit rate of 8 percent on investments of various
types and durabilities while providing the investors with a common
10 percent after-credit (before income tax) rate of return in every
case.
Unfortunately it is difficult to relate these illustrative figures to ac-
tual tax practice or to draw policy guidance from them beyond what
emerges from the qualitative argument of the theory. Indeed, the
theoretical argument is less than satisfactory. Apart from their being
cast in a steady state framework, the theoretical conclusions have the
shortcoming of being based on the assumption that the market cost
of investments correctly measures the consumption goods forgone.19
But presumably the relative market prices of various investment and
consumer goods are influenced by the investment tax credit.
This issue is too complicated to do more than suggest the nature of
the problem here. Suppose, for example, that a machine of some type
can be produced either directly by conversion of consumption goods
or indirectly by the machine itself. The higher the investment credit,
19. All of this assumes that the second-best rules call for production efficiency.
Even this rule may not hold under some circumstances; see J. E. Stiglitz and P.
Dasgupta, "Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency,' Review
0/Economic Studies, vol. 38 (April 1971), pp. 15 1—74.296 The Economics of Taxation
Table 1. Illustrative Schedule of Durability-Neutral Investment Tax Credit
Rates in percent







































































a. Undervariousassumptions about form and duration of return patterns, entries show investment
credit requiredtogenerate a rate of return (I) of 10 percent to the investor when the common underlying
rate of return (r) is 8 percent.
b. This can be interpreted as assuming the asset disappears at rate te', where s is the time since con-
struction.
C. A unit investment at time 0 yields ya at time d.
d.A unit investment at time 0 yields a steady flow xr of output until time T.
e.k(ö)=1—(r +5)1(1 + 5).
1.k(d)=1 —exp(r —i)d.
g.k(T)I— (r/0[1 — exp (—i7))J(l — exp (—rT)).
thelower will be the equilibrium rental price of machines. As a result,
machines will increasingly be produced by other machines rather
than by direct conversion of consumption goods. The outcome is a
tax-induced inefficiency in the production of machines. If the
machine-produced machine differs from the directly-converted-f rom-
consumption-goods machine with respect to durability, it may be
possible to offset this inefficiency through appropriate useful life dis-
crimination in the credit rules.
There is another shortcoming in the theoretical argument that ap-
pears in many efficiency analyses: the absence of guidance on how
much difference mistakes make. Remedying this defect seems out
of the question, however, as it would require a knowledge of the
elasticities of substitution of each machine type for others in produc-
tion, as well as of the production conditions of the machines them-
selves. (Remember that the term "machine" is used here to represent
all forms of investment.)Tax Neutrality and the Investment Tax Credit 297














2/3 3 2.7 3.3
2/5 5 4.0 6.7
2/7 7 5.1 10.0
1/5 10 6.5 10.0
1/6 12 7.3 10.0
2/15 15 8.4 10.0
1/10 20 9.9 10.0
Source: Based on Emil Sunley, Jr., 'Tax Neutrality between Capital Services Provided by Long-Lived
and Short-Lived Assets," in U.S. Department of the Treasury, OTA Papers. vol. I: Compilation of OTA
Papers(GPO, 1978), p. 15. Investor obtains 10 percent return (before tax) on all asxet classes; before-
credit return is 8 percent on all assets. For details of assumptions see text.
a. Exponential decay rate.
b. Neglects extra credit for employee stock ownership plan.
Ifthese technical problems are overlooked, practical difficulties
in using the figures in table 1 remain. For one thing, it is not clear how
one should associate the various durability parameters of the table to
the concept of "useful life" in U.S. tax law. Does an asset exponen-
tially decaying at 10 percent a year (average life, ten years; half life,
seven years) have a longer or shorter useful life than one producing
all its output exactly ten years after construction or one producing a
constant flow output for, say, fifteen years? Second, allowance must
be made for the fact that the figures in the table are based on requiring
a deduction of investment credit from the basis for depreciation and
using true economic depreciation for tax purposes.
Basing his calculations on an unpublished paper by T. Nicholaus
Tideman, Sunley derived the investment credit schedule required for
neutrality (in the sense analyzed here) assuming (1) original pur-
chase price used as the basis for depreciation; (2) exponential decay
of assets; (3) sum-of-years method of depreciation for tax purposes,
interpreting 2/6 as the useful life of an asset decaying at rate 8; and
(4) a marginal tax rate of 0.48 (needed because tax depreciation is
different from economic depreciation) •20Sunley'sneutral credit
schedule is shown in table 2. It is interesting and somewhat surprising
20. See Sunley, "Tax Neutrality between Capital Services Provided by Long-
Lived and Short-Lived Assets"; and T. Nicolaus Tideman, "Refinements in the
Formula for the Price of Capital Services and Their Application to Tax Neutrality"
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howsimilar the neutral credit rates are under the more realistic as-
sumptions made by Sunley and those for exponential decay in table 1.
The fit of both of these with present law also appears better than might
have been expected, and it looks even better if one measures useful
life by the average or expected life of the asset, 1/s, instead of 2/&
On the other hand, under the exponential depreciation assumption
there is clearly a bias in present law against the long-lived assets, and
there is no way of assessing the importance of other patterns of in-
vestment returns. These are but two relatively unimportant reasons
for a substantial revision in the way capital income is measured and
taxed. But this is the subject of another paper.21
21. The results of this paper and those of Arnold Harberger's paper in this volume
are complementary. I show that if depreciation is allowed on the net price of a capital
good—the purchase price less the investment tax credit—then a neutral investment
credit depends on the pattern of true economic depreciation and rises with dura-
bility. Harberger shows that if depreciation is allowed on 100 (1 —kit) percentof
the purchase price of a capital good (where k is the investment credit rate and tis
the income tax rate), then a constant investment tax credit is neutral. To illustrate,
if the tax rate is 40 percent and the credit is 10 percent, then the credit is neutral with
respect to durability if the firm is permitted tax depreciation equal to true economic
depreciation on 75 percent of the value of the capital good; if the firm can de-
preciate any larger fraction of the value, and in particular if it can depreciate 90
percent as under the Long Amendment, then a constant credit favors short-lived
capital goods and a neutral credit must rise with durability.